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Traditional analyses of international terrorism have not sought to explain the emergence of rare
but extremely severe events. Using the tools of extremal statistics to analyze the set of terrorist
attacks worldwide between 1968 and 2004, as compiled by the National Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), we find that the relationship between the frequency and severity of
terrorist attacks exhibits the “scale-free” property with an exponent of close to two. This property
is robust, even when we restrict our analysis to events from a single type of weapon or events within
major industrialized nations. We also find that the distribution of event sizes has changed very little
over the past 37 years, suggesting that scale invariance is an inherent feature of global terrorism.
Although terrorism has a long historical relationship
with politics [1], only in the modern era have small groups
of non-state actors had access to extremely destructive
weapons [2, 3], particularly chemical or explosive agents.
This dramatic increase in destructive power has allowed
severe terrorist attacks such as the March 20 1995 release
of the Sarin nerve agent in a Tokyo subway which injured
or killed over 5000, the August 7 1998 car bombing in
Nairobi, Kenya which injured or killed over 5200, or the
more well known attack on September 11 2001 in New
York City which killed 2823 [19]. Typical analyses of
patterns of terrorist events have treated such rare but
severe attacks as outliers, and generally focused attention
only on the group of subjectively defined “significant”
events [2, 4]. We show here, by examining data over the
past 37 years, that discounting extremal events as special
cases ignores a significant pattern in terrorism.
Using the tools of extremal statistics, we characterize
the relationship between the severity and frequency of
terrorist events. By severity, we simply mean the num-
ber of individuals injured or killed by an attack. We
show that this relationship may be well-characterized
by the simple mathematical function, the power law
P (x) ∼ x−α, where α is the scaling exponent. Such a
pattern is said to be “scale invariant,” and is ubiquitous
in nature, appearing in the frequency of word usage in
a variety of languages (known more commonly as Zipf’s
Law), the number of citations per scientific paper, the
population of cities, the magnitude of earthquakes, the
net worth in US dollars of individuals, etc. (see, for ex-
ample, [5]). For this work, the most relevant power law
is the well established one governing the relationship be-
tween the frequency and intensity [20] of wars [6, 7, 8, 9],
to which we will return in a later section.
Although many organizations track such attacks
worldwide, few provide their data publicly or in any-
thing but an aggregate form. The MIPT database ap-
pears to be unique in its comprehensive detail, contain-
ing, as of January 2005, records of over 19 907 terror-
ist events in 187 countries worldwide between 1968 and
2004. Of these, 7 088 resulted in at least one person being
injured or killed. The MIPT database is itself the com-
pilation of the RAND Terrorism Chronology 1968-1997,
the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident database (1998-
Present), the Terrorism Indictment database (University
of Arkansas & University of Oklahoma), and DFI In-
ternational’s research on terrorist organizations. Each
record includes the date, target, city (if applicable), coun-
try, type of weapon used, terrorist group responsible (if
known), number of deaths (if known), number of in-
juries (if known), a brief description of the attack and
the source of the information.
Global Patterns
Tabulating the event data as a histogram of severity (in-
juries, deaths and their aggregation, greater than zero),
we show the cumulative distribution functions P (X ≥ x)
on log-log axes in Figure 1a. The regularity of the scal-
ing in the tails of these distributions suggests that the
extremal events are not outliers, but are instead in con-
cordance with a global pattern in terrorist attacks. This
scaling exists in spite of strong heterogeneity in the type
of weapon, the perpetrating organization, geographic lo-
cation, political motivation behind the attack, etc.
Assuming for the moment that the events are i.i.d., we
hypothesize that the distributions follow power laws of
the form P (x) ∼ x−α above some minimum value xmin.
We use the log-likelihood function for the discrete power
law with minimum value xmin,
L = lnP (x|α)
= −
n∑
i=xmin

α ln xi + ln

ζ(α)−
xmin−1∑
j=1
x−αj




to fit the distributions, where ζ(α) is the Reimann zeta
function. Our procedure is thus: we bootstrap a numeric
maximization of L to estimate the scaling parameter α,
and minimize the D-statistic of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
goodness-of-fit test to select the parameter xmin. Using
Monto Carlo methods to generate a table of p-values for
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test for power law
with the estimated α and xmin, we find that there is in-
sufficient evidence to reject the power law as a model of
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FIG. 1: The distributions P (X ≥ x) of attack severity for attacks worldwide between 1968 and 2004 (a) by injuries, deaths
and their aggregation, (b) for before and after the management of the database was assumed by MIPT, and (c) for events
inside versus outside the G7 industrialized nations. Solid lines are guides indicating the maximum likelihood power laws given
in Table I.
the tails of these distributions. We will see in a later
section, however, that these distributions are the compo-
sition of several distinct power laws with different scal-
ing parameters and ranges, which, in turn, causes some
roughness in the power law model. Although we do
find sufficient evidence to reject the log-normal distri-
bution [10] hypothesis in all cases (pKS < 0.05), we can-
not completely rule out Type I/II errors as asymptotic
scaling tests are quite sensitive to the range and num-
ber of observations. The consideration of other heavy-
tailed distributions, e.g., the q-exponential e−αxq or the
stretched exponential e−αx
β
, which may result in a bet-
ter fit of the lower tail of the distributions, is beyond the
scope of this work. Table I summarizes the statistics and
power law models for all distributions shown in Figure 1.
A few brief comments are in order. The form of
our power law model ignores all data below xmin; thus,
we only model the upper tails and say nothing about
the shallow scaling off the lower tails (e.g., injuries, to-
tal). Additionally, within the range defined by xmin, the
power law is not as clean as, for example, that of earth-
quakes [5]. In a system as complex as global terrorism,
such irregularities are to be expected; however, the ap-
pearance of scale invariance is not. Finally, Figure 1b and
c show two additional views of global terrorism, which we
will explain in the subsequent section.
Bias, Trends and Components
A significant event during the 37 years over which the
MIPT database spans was the assumption of data man-
agement by the MIPT from the RAND corporation in
1998. This event raises the natural question of whether
any fundamental bias has been introduced into the data
as a result of differing management practices or changes
to the criteria used to judge the admissibility of an event,
differences which may result in the regular scaling ob-
served in Figure 1a. In this section, we explore this ques-
tion and characterize the evolution of the distribution as
a function of time.
Distribution 〈x〉 std. xmax α xmin pKS ≥
Injuries 14.60 114.82 5000 2.40(6) 34 0.658
Deaths 5.13 43.37 2823 2.21(6) 8 0.632
t < 1998 5.18 19.21 329 1.92(3) 1 0.999
t ≥ 1998 5.11 51.20 2823 2.00(2) 2 0.999
Total 12.70 103.38 5291 2.17(4) 26 0.404
G7 22.66 241.18 5012 1.71(3) 1 0.997
Non-G7 11.80 79.85 5291 2.5(1) 86 0.971
TABLE I: A summary of the distributions shown in Fig-
ure 1, and their maximum likelihood power laws. The value
in parentheses is the estimated error in the last digit of the
scaling exponent.
Reporting Bias. In Figure 1b, we plot the severity dis-
tributions (deaths) for all events before (2 304, or 33%)
and after (4 784, or 67%) the change in management,
which we take to occur on 1 January 1998. Notably, the
distributions are very similar and the scaling robust to
the significant increase in the frequency of events after
1998. We find that both distributions follow a power
law with exponent α ≈ 2 and that, in spite of differ-
ences in the mid- and upper-tail, the slope changed by
only 4%. Although we don’t model it as such, the ear-
lier distribution may be best fit by a power law with
exponential cutoff beginning at x = 87; such a cutoff
could be the result of technological constraints. Gener-
ally, the appearance of the scale invariance itself seems
unlikely to be the result of changes in database manage-
ment. Unfortunately, we have no way of accounting for
any human-bias in the decision of an event’s admissibil-
ity. However, an analysis of the smaller but independent
database maintained by the International Policy Institute
for Counter-Terrorism’s (ICT) [21], which contains 1417
events between May 1980 and December 2002, yields sim-
ilar results (not shown), suggesting that the scaling in the
upper tails is a robust feature of global terrorism.
3Inter-event Interval. We now consider the evolution of
the severity distribution over time. As mentioned above,
the majority of events which killed or injured at least
one person have occurred since 1998. Figure 2 (left axis)
shows the mean time (in days) between recorded events,
taken over a 12 month sliding-window. The decrease in
the mean inter-event interval is striking, falling from ap-
proximately 28 days in early 1968 to less than 12 hours in
2004. The precipitous drop in 1998 is especially notable,
and suggests that when the database changed hands, the
admission criteria may have become more permissive or
a significantly larger number of events were being evalu-
ated. However, Figure 2 illustrates that the decrease in
inter-event time has been a largely continuous trend over
the entire lifetime of the database. We note that this
increase in the frequency of recorded events worldwide
is consistent with findings by the United States Depart-
ment of State [4]. Thus, while it seems plausible that
the change in maintenance did result in some increase in
reporting frequency, we cannot rule out the possibility
that there has been a genuine increase in the frequency
of attacks in recent years.
Global Trends. Given that the distributions we ob-
serve in Figure 1a and b are a collection of events over
time, we may naturally wonder if each event was drawn
from the same distribution (i.e., the severity distribution
is stable), or if the distribution has changed in some way.
The right-axis in Figure 2 shows the average log-severity
of events within the same sliding window of 12 months,
over the 37 years of data. Let us assume that each event
was drawn independently from the distribution p(x). We
then expect the time series to fluctuate about the av-
erage log-severity for the entire time period, which is
〈ln(s)〉 = 1.126. This appears to be the case, although
we also measure a slight linear trend in this function, by
least-squares, with slope m = 4.2 × 10−4. Using Monte
Carlo simulation, we test the likelihood that this linear
trend is the result of random fluctuations arising from
the variation in sampling frequency. To do this, we sim-
ulate a new sequence of events by drawing a new sever-
ity value from the hypothesized heavy-tailed distribution
p(x) (Table I) for each observed time; we then compute
the window-averaged log-severity as above and measure
its linear component m∗. Repeating this process many
times, we find that we may reject the random-fluctuation
hypothesis (pMC < 0.013). Bootstrapping the observed
distribution yields a similar conclusion. Thus, we may
say with some confidence that while the severity distri-
bution has certainly not changed much over the past 37
years, the slight linear trend is unlikely to be the result
of random fluctuations due to sampling, or the increased
frequency of events in recent years.
Component Distributions. As mentioned above, the
richness of the event meta-data allows for many views
of global terrorism. Here, we focus specifically on those
which are relevant to the appearance of scale invariance
in the severity distributions. Dividing events into cate-
gories for those occurring within the major industrialized
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FIG. 2: Time series showing (left axis) the average inter-
event interval over a sliding window of 12 months, and (right
axis) the average logarithm of the total severity of attacks
over the same window of 12 months. The dashed line shows
the average log-severity for all events. Over the course of the
37 years, we find a slight, but statistically significant, linear
trend in the breadth of p(x), with slope m = 4.2 × 10−4,
despite large changes in the frequency of events.
nations, i.e., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States, known collec-
tively as the G7 (590 events over 37 years), and those
occurring throughout the rest of the world (6 498 events,
or 92%), we plot the corresponding severity distributions
(total) in Figure 1c (also summarized in Table I). Most
notable is the substantial difference in the scaling in the
upper tails: αG7 = 1.71±0.03 versus αnon−G7 = 2.5±0.1;
that is, the largest events are significantly more likely to
occur within one of the G7 nations than elsewhere in
the world. We have no firm explanation for such a dis-
tinction, although it may be the result of technological
differences. That is, small groups of non-state actors may
have access to a greater degree of destructive potential
as a result of industrialization.
We may also divide the events into groups based on the
type of weapon used; Figure 3 shows the (total severity)
distributions of events for chemical or biological weapons,
explosives (including remotely detonated devices), fire,
firearms, knives and a catch-all category “other” (which
also includes unconventional and unknown weapons).
Surprisingly, these component distributions are all well-
modeled by power laws (pKS ≥ 0.9), which we summarize
in Table II. There are several points to be made by this
observation. First, the trend in the lower tails of Fig-
ure 1a and c (injuries or total, and non-G7, respectively)
is now obviously caused by some property of explosives.
Additionally, different weapon types clearly exhibit dis-
tinct cutoffs, as one might expect, e.g., knives have the
smallest associated maximum severity.
4Models and Mechanisms
We believe that the scale invariance in global terror-
ism is related in some way to the power law observed
by Richardson in 1948 [6], and confirmed independently
by [8, 9], for the frequency versus intensity of wars. Using
a similar maximum likelihood method on the historical
war data of Small and Singer [11], Newman found a scal-
ing parameter of α = 1.80± 0.09, which is close to several
of those that we measure for global terrorism.
Given the appearance of scale invariance across many
views of global terrorism, we may now ask if a simple
generative model exists which might explain its origin.
We note that the complexity of terrorism makes such
a simple explanation unlikely or, at best, highly sus-
ceptible to criticism. In this section, we discuss a few
power-law mechanisms which are appealing for the sys-
tem of terrorism/counter-terrorism (see [5, 12, 13] for
brief surveys of other power-law mechanisms). Although
it has been suggested that Richardson’s scaling law is
the result of a metastability in a geopolitical system [14]
that has driven itself to a state of self-organized criti-
cality (SOC) [15], this hypothesis seems ill-suited to ex-
plain the scaling in the severity of terrorist attacks. An-
other appealing model is that of highly optimized tol-
erance (HOT) [16]; however, because it relies both on
risk-neutrality and underlying geometric constraints to
produce power laws [17], it seems a poor fit for our sys-
tem. Indeed, the most appealing model, and one that is
strongly supported by the data, is one based on the mix-
ing of component distributions such as those in Figure 1c
and Figure 3.
In the interest of framing future work in this area, we
suggest a short list of criteria by which to judge any
proposed general model of global terrorism: a success-
ful model must (in order of importance)
1. represent an intuitive mechanism by which to gen-
erate the size of an actual event (e.g., a competition
between states and non-state actors);
2. produce heavy tails with appropriate scaling
(Fig. 1a);
3. allow for the resulting distributions and dynamics
to vary in time; and,
4. account for the differences in scaling caused by
technology, e.g., industrial versus non-industrial
nations (Fig. 1c) and types of weapons (Fig. 3).
We will now analyze a highly idealized mathematical
model of the competition between non-state actors and
states which satisfies these criteria in the most general
sense. Let us assume a large population of non-state ac-
tors, each of whom is responsible for executing a single
event, and let each event’s severity be given by a ran-
dom variable s with distribution p(s), with some maxi-
mum value smax. Now assume that some, but not all,
events are actually executed, perhaps because of collec-
tive counter-terrorism actions by states, social factors,
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FIG. 3: Total severity distributions and their corresponding
maximum likelihood power laws (see Table II) for six weapon
types: chemical or biological agents (0.4% of events), ex-
plosives (including remotely detonated devices) (44.3%), fire
(1.7%), firearms (36.2%), knives (3.3%) and other (which in-
cludes unconventional and unknown weapon types) (14.2%).
Distribution 〈x〉 std. xmax α xmin pKS ≥
Chem/Bio 198.73 981.84 5012 1.8(2) 1 0.912
Explosives 20.42 111.03 5291 2.38(7) 46 0.894
Fire 19.69 113.78 1200 1.74(9) 2 0.973
Firearms 4.29 28.32 1065 2.17(3) 3 0.997
Knives 2.35 7.28 107 2.3(1) 1 0.999
Other 6.85 89.66 2823 2.07(5) 3 0.991
TABLE II: A summary of the distributions shown in Fig-
ure 3, and their maximum likelihood power laws. The value
in parentheses is the estimated error in the last digit of the
scaling exponent.
random failures, etc. Thus, the distribution of actual
events p(x) is given by a sampling of the distribution of
potential severities p(s), and may be derived by solving
the equation
p(x)dx = p(s)ds .
Suppose that, perhaps as a result of factors such as the
relative availability of cheap weapons, prevalence of po-
tential targets, technological advances [3], etc., the distri-
bution of potential severities is exponential, p(s) ∼ eas,
with a > 0 up to some smax. Now suppose that the like-
lihood of an event being successful is inversely related to
its potential severity, so the relationship between x and
s might be given by x ∼ ebs with b < 0. Under these
assumptions, the solution to our general equation above
yields a power law p(x) ∼ x−α, where α = 1−a/b. When
|a| ≈ |b|, we derive a power law with exponent α ≈ 2.
As shown clearly in Figure 3, the severity distribu-
5tion for global terrorism is itself composed of several dis-
tinct component distributions. Thus, it is appealing to
consider mathematical models derived from distribution
mixtures, e.g.,
p(x) =
∫
g(z) fz(x) dz ,
where z distinguishes each component distribution fz(x),
and g(z) is some mixing function. From this approach, if
the fz(x) decay faster than any power law, then p(x) itself
will only be a power law when g(z) is a power law [18].
Thus, we must still rely upon a power-law generating
mechanism, such as the idealized one given above. How-
ever, this meta-model has the appealing feature of being
able to capture real heterogeneity in the data: if we take
g(z) to be some constant, and let (a/b)G7 = 1.71 and
(a/b)non−G7 = 2.5, we may recover a distribution which
has scaling in the upper tail like that of total severity in
Figure 1a. An empirical estimate of these ratios would
provide a point of validation for our model, but admit-
tedly may be quite difficult to make.
The mixtures model may be even more useful. As we
would expect, Figure 3 shows that the severity of an event
is governed by the type of weapon used. Thus, the choice
of exponential distribution for the potential severity of
an event p(s) ∼ eas must itself be a mixture of weapon-
specific distributions. We note also that our simple gen-
erative model may be extended to incorporate the slight
temporal trend in the average log-severity of events, as
illustrated in Figure 2 by simply letting the parameters
a and b vary in time. Finally, it should be noted that our
simple model assumes each event is drawn i.i.d. from the
underlying distribution; obviously, in the real data, there
are likely strong temporal correlations associated with
various geopolitical events and policies. A more realistic
model might account for these correlations.
Conclusions
In exploring the distribution of the severity of events in
global terrorism, we have found a surprising and robust
feature: scale invariance. Traditional analyses of terror-
ism have typically viewed catastrophic events such as the
1995 truck bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi,
Kenya, which killed or injured more than 5 200, as out-
liers. However, the property of scale invariance suggests
that these are instead a part of a statistically significant
global pattern in terrorism. Further, we find little reason
to believe that the appearance of power laws in the dis-
tribution of the severity of an event is the result of either
reporting bias or changes in database management. This
suggests that the power law distribution, with α ≈ 2, is
an inherent feature of terrorism and counter-terrorism.
Indeed, the severity distribution itself has changed very
little over the past 37 years of recorded events (Fig. 2),
in spite of a dramatic increase in the frequency of events.
This small growth in the breadth of the severity distri-
bution may be the result of technological changes, such
as the power and availability of cheap explosives and
firearms.
Surprisingly, the scale-invariance result extends be-
yond the total collection of events. When we examine the
distributions for major industrialized nations versus the
rest of the world, we find that heavy tails are present in
both (Fig. 1c), but with substantially different exponents:
αG7 = 1.71 ± 0.03 versus αnon−G7 = 2.5 ± 0.1. That is,
while events occur much less frequently in major industri-
alized nations, when they do, they are much more severe
(on average) than events outside those nations. Addition-
ally, when events are partitioned by weapon type, statis-
tically significant power laws persist (Fig. 3, Table II)
and show that any roughness in the scaling of the aggre-
gate distributions (e.g., Fig. 1a) is derived from the com-
position weapon-specific power laws with distinct scal-
ing parameters and ranges. It also illustrates that there
is something unique about explosives, which causes the
shallow scaling of the lower tail for the injuries severity
distribution.
There are many generative mechanisms in the liter-
ature for power laws, although many of them are un-
appealing for explaining the structure we find in global
terrorism. The highly abstract model of competition be-
tween non-state actors and states, which we propose, an-
alyze and extend via the mixtures model, is likely too
simple to capture the fine structure of global terrorism.
However, we hope that our model and the statistically
significant empirical regularities which we show here will
frame future efforts to understand global terrorism.
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